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In this Essay I would like to share some reflections on the politics 
of same-sex marriage politics. In a very short period of time, this issue has 
moved to the center of the gay and lesbian rights movement as well as 
larger mainstream political and legal debates. Some have even argued that 
this issue affected, if not determined, the outcome of the 2004 presidential 
election. This, I believe, is rather an overstatement, but I must concede that 
the issue has gained traction in ways that most of us would not have 
predicted five years ago. The states of Vermont and Connecticut have 
enacted Civil Union laws for same-sex couples, the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts now allows both same and different sex couples to marry, 
and, in the last year, trial courts have found unconstitutional the exclusion 
of same-sex couples from the institution of marriage in New York and 
California. Spain has now joined some of its fellow EU members in the 
Rhine Delta by allowing same-sex couples to marry, and the Constitutional 
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Court of South Africa found that the South African Constitution requires 
that same-sex couples be permitted to marry on terms equal to those made 
available to different sex couples. 1  At the same time, Governor 
Schwarzenegger vetoed the same-sex marriage law in California, courts in 
Arizona and Indiana rejected constitutional challenges to their marriage 
laws, an intermediate appellate court in New York reversed a trial court 
finding that same-sex couples should be permitted to marry, and referenda 
barring same-sex marriage swept the country in 2004 and 2005 and will, no 
doubt, continue to do so in 2006. Forty-two states have enacted “little 
DOMAs,”2 limiting the institution of marriage to one man and one woman. 
This issue, like so many others in American politics at the present moment, 
is highly polarized—rarely garnering moderate positions.  
I would like to reflect on this dynamic political, moral, and legal 
moment—which, I fear, may have shifted again by the time you finish 
reading this Essay—by offering some thoughts about how and why this 
particular issue has emerged as the highest of priorities in the gay 
community, and what might be the costs of such a strategic choice. Just two 
years ago, in sweeping language, the U.S. Supreme Court found laws that 
criminalized same-sex sex unconstitutional in Lawrence v. Texas. This 
decision has been widely referred to in the lesbian and gay legal community 
as “our Brown,” referring to the landmark 1954 desegregation decision 
Brown v. Board of Education. By this, of course, it is meant that Lawrence 
would usher in a civil rights revolution for gay men and lesbians in a 
fashion equivalent to the civil rights movement inaugurated by Brown. 
In an Essay published in 2004, I offered a more modest appraisal of 
the promise of Lawrence than that advanced by the leaders of the major gay 
rights organizations in New York and Washington.3 I also voiced concern 
about the direction that the gay community was taking in its infatuation 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Columbia University. I presented earlier versions of this Essay 
at NYU Law School’s Review of Law and Social Change colloquium on Continuing the 
Civil Rights Movement: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Equality; Yale Law 
School’s symposium on Breaking with Tradition: New Frontiers for Same-Sex Marriage; the 
Feminist Debates series at Rice University; the Feminism and Law Workshop at the Faculty 
of Law of the University of Toronto; and the 10/10 lunch group at Columbia Law School. At 
each of these venues I received extremely thoughtful comments and engagements with the 
essay. All of the members of these variously assembled groups, of course, should be excused 
from any negative associations that might attach to the arguments I make herein. 
1 Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, CCT 60/04 (Dec. 1, 2005). 
2 The Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2005), sometimes referred to 
as “DOMA,” bars the federal recognition of same-sex marriages by any of the states and 
invites states to refuse to give full faith and credit to same-sex marriages entered into in 
another state.  
3 Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (2004). 
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with domesticity and respectability, as well as the dangers inherent in this 
particular paradigm shift in the way the state regulated same-sex sex. In this 
Essay I would like to elaborate on some of the ideas I gestured toward in 
that Essay, particularly in light of developments in the last year or so.  
As a political and a legal matter, decriminalization lands one in 
both an interesting and, for some, uncomfortable social position. In 
important respects, gay people’s relationship to the state at this moment 
shares some similarities with the position of freed men and women in the 
nineteenth century in the period between the ratification of the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. Black people were no longer enslaved or 
enslavable, yet they did not enjoy robust civil and political rights either. 
They were not citizens or full civil and political subjects, rather they were 
freed-people, not free people. It took the 1866 Civil Rights Act and 
ultimately the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution to transform 
Black people into African-Americans. The middle ground they lived in 
during the period between emancipation and citizenship I have come to call 
“freed-dom.” 
Gay men and lesbians find themselves in a similar civil and 
political middle ground now as well. Decriminalization merely disables a 
form of public regulation of private adult activity, it is nothing more than 
the undoing of delegitimization; indeed, it neither sanctions nor suggests 
any alternative form of legitimization. So too, it does not render, determine, 
or require a particular form of political legibility. It merely signals a public 
tolerance of same-sex sexual behavior, so long as it takes place in private, 
and between two consenting adults in a relationship. By steps from Bowers 
to Lawrence, lesbigay people have sought to reposition themselves in the 
American polity from a liminal location saturated by perversion, to 
membership in this political community as equals and as peers. 
Of course there was an intermediary step between Bowers and 
Lawrence. In Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court, over the predictably 
vehement objections of Justice Scalia, invalidated a Colorado referendum 
that prohibited state or local governments from extending civil rights 
protections to persons on the basis of sexual orientation. The Court based 
this holding on the normative assertion that it was illegitimate to enact laws 
that are based in nothing more than a dislike of a class of people. In a sense 
the Court used this as an opportunity to rearticulate an anti-caste principle. 
Romer and Lawrence taken together shifted the treatment of us by 
them from the domain of criminalization, shunning, and shaming to 
tolerance. These cases stand for the proposition, among other things, that 
majoritarian revulsion of this minority cannot form the legitimate basis of 
our regulation by civil or criminal law. 
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Yet, as political scientist Wendy Brown argues in her forthcoming 
book on tolerance,4 being tolerated is a liberal conceit that entails a set of 
dilemmas that may help us understand the complicated politics of same-sex 
marriage. Tolerance within liberalism works so long as that thing about you 
to be tolerated remains both private and individualized—that is to say, so 
long as it does not make a political claim. And, of course, that is exactly 
what the demand for recognition of same-sex marriage amounts to—a claim 
against the political, although articulated in the legal vernacular of rights. 
Justice Kennedy went to great lengths in his opinion in Lawrence to 
immunize the decision from the political—casting it again and again as a 
dispute about private conduct that entailed nothing with respect to political 
recognition of same-sex sex or same-sex coupling. This inoculation, I 
suspect, has failed miserably. 
In the end, Justice Scalia was right—Lawrence emboldened, 
inspired, and indeed enabled the political claim that the state could no 
longer refuse to recognize same-sex marriages. We should note, however, 
that the shift from decriminalization to recognition of same-sex partnerships 
requires more, or indeed something else than, an argument based on 
tolerance. Those who advocate for same-sex marriage are not asking that 
the majority bracket the disgust they hold for us so long as our sex is 
privatized and individualized. Rather, this is a public argument of a 
collective nature—we want to be included in “We the People.” 
What’s wrong with that? Well, just as the argument from tolerance 
comes at a price, so too does this one. As I have argued elsewhere, the 
rights-bearing subject of the lesbigay rights movement has now become 
“the couple”—a We. It is a domesticated couple, and it is a couple that 
seeks a particular location within a genealogical kinship grid that sutures 
the couple to the nation. The project of inclusion in We the People 
presupposes, not necessarily, but in this particular movement, a certain kind 
of citizen-subject who becomes politically legible by and through a 
particular form of intimate affiliation. Of course, the citizen-subjects who 
have signed up for this form of enfranchisement are called upon to enact a 
peculiar set of public performances: lining up in pairs outside of City Hall 
the moment the Mayor deems the marriage registry open to homo business; 
placing your wedding announcement in the New York Times; posing model 
homo families—our perfect plaintiffs—before the media. I must confess an 
unease with what feels like the deployment of children as props that attest 
to our normalcy, a repudiation of our perversion. To my mind this sort of 
enfranchisement swerves dangerously in the direction of a kind of franchise. 
The creation of new gay publics outside City Hall, on the pages of the New 
York Times, and on the six o’clock news are not exactly the gay publics the 
drag queens at Stonewall had in mind.  
                                                 
4 WENDY BROWN, REGULATING AVERSION: TOLERANCE IN THE AGE OF IDENTITY 
AND EMPIRE (forthcoming 2006).  
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It’s a tired argument by now that the problem with these staged 
spectacles of homo kinship is that they are boring, though of course they are. 
How can it be that in such a short period of time the spectacularity of 
gayness has become so dull? Consider Ellen DeGeneres—only a few short 
years ago a trail-blazer as the first out lesbian character on television whose 
very being was regarded as a threat to all things descent and christian, now 
a cute and innocuous daytime talk show host whose lesbianism is less her 
signature than are her sneakers. Perhaps this is best understood as the 
consequence of an increasingly successful civil rights movement—as the 
claims of the movement gain greater acceptance in the larger society those 
claims become less alarming. Or maybe it is the other way around—
diminished alarm motivates political possibility. More radical critics would 
argue that the same-sex marriage movement has accelerated and privileged 
the more assimilationist aspects of the gay rights struggle.5 
What we are witnessing in the gay community, I would argue, is a 
radical substitution or transformation of the nature of homosexual desire. 
Into the psychic space created by decriminalization has rushed a desire for 
governance, a desire for recognition—recognition by legal and state 
authority. The de jure refusal to all gay people to satisfy this desire has 
formed the basis of the new civil rights claims made on behalf of “the 
community.” Take, for instance, the complaint filed in the case challenging 
New York’s marriage law. Lambda Legal—the preeminent gay and lesbian 
rights legal organization—argued on behalf of the five same-sex couples 
who sought to be married that the marriage law denied Lauren Abrams and 
Donna Freeman-Tweed’s right of “their families to have the recognition . . . 
that heterosexuals have. They want to be able to say to their children, ‘Your 
parents are married.’”6  Plaintiffs Douglas Robinson and Michael Elsasser, 
a male couple who have been together for seventeen years and have two 
sons, “want the public recognition of their commitment . . . that comes with 
legal marriage.”7 Mary Jo Kennedy and Jo-Ann Shain “want to express 
their love and commitment through civil marriage . . . . Their daughter, too, 
wants to see her mothers marry and for their loving relationship to be 
accorded the same respect and recognition as those of her friends’ married 
parents.”8  
The complaint in this case is interesting for the primacy it gives to 
the harm of non-recognition; indeed, non-recognition lies at the core of the 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL (1999). 
6 First Amended Complaint at 5, Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2004) (No. 103434/2004), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/binary-
data/LAMBDA_PDF/pdf/278.pdf. 
7 Id. at 6. 
8 Id. at 6-7. 
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discriminatory harm at stake in this and almost all the other marriage cases. 
Notice that in two short years the central civil rights injury articulated by 
the gay community has shifted from one of mis-recognition, i.e., the 
regulation and legal categorization of same-sex sex as criminal, to a claim 
of non-recognition. Justice Albie Sachs, writing for the South African 
Constitutional Court in the Fourie case, described it as “the tangible 
damage to same-sex couples . . . obliged to live in a state of legal 
blankness.”9 Virtually overnight we have gone from hiding in the bushes in 
parks or in bathrooms at rest areas desperately trying to avoid the law, to 
standing in town squares and on courthouse steps desperately waiving our 
hands in the air trying to get law’s attention.  
Could it be that we are suffering what we might call a “Moynihan 
moment?” 10  Sectors of our community have argued that our 
unmarriagability inflicts a kind of harm on our children in terms that echo 
the manner in which familial pathology and illegitimacy were thought to 
cause injury to African-American children in the Moynihan Report. The 
Human Rights Campaign’s report, The Cost of Marriage Inequality to 
Children of Same-Sex Parents, does just this, arguing that “until all states 
grant equal marriage to same-sex couples, the children in these families will 
continue to be deprived of the security of being recognized as a ‘legal 
family.’”11 So, too, in a brief submitted in the case challenging New Jersey’s 
ban on same-sex marriage, the American and New Jersey Psychological 
Associations argued that 
marriage can be expected to benefit the children of gay and 
lesbian couples by reducing the stigma currently associated with 
those children’s status. Such stigma can derive from various 
sources. When same-sex partners cannot marry, their biological 
children are born “out-of-wedlock,” conferring a status that 
historically has been stigmatized as “illegitimacy” and 
“bastardy.” Although the social stigma attached to illegitimacy 
has declined in many parts of society, being born to unmarried 
                                                 
9 Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, CCT 60/04 ¶ 72 (Dec. 1, 2005). 
10 See Daniel Patrick Moynihan, The Negro Family: The Case for National Action, 
in THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY (Lee Rainwater & William L. 
Yancey eds., 1967) [hereinafter Moynihan Report]. The Moynihan Report was written by 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan when he was an assistant secretary of labor in the Johnson 
administration. He argued that the most fundamental problem facing the Black community in 
the United States was the “tangle of pathology” produced by the community’s low rates of 
long-term marriages and high rates of promiscuity, illegitimacy, and matriarchal, female-
headed households. 
11  LISA BENNETT & GARY J. GATES, THE COST OF MARRIAGE INEQUALITY TO 
CHILDREN AND THEIR SAME-SEX PARENTS: A HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION 
REPORT 13 (2004), available at http://www.hrc.org/Content/ContentGroups/Publications1/ 
kids_doc_final.pdf. 
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parents is still widely considered undesirable. As a result, 
children of parents who are not married may be stigmatized by 
others, such as peers or school staff members. This stigma of 
illegitimacy will not be visited upon the children of same-sex 
couples when those couples can legally marry.12
Nancy Polikoff, long a sceptic of the revolutionary potential of 
same-sex marriage,13 has recently written a very thoughtful critique of the 
intersecting arguments made by both proponents and opponents of same-
sex marriage who “piggyback on the polarizing and politically charged 
assertion that children do best when their parents are married to persuade 
the public and the courts that lesbian and gay couples be allowed to 
marry.”14 Polikoff rightly observes that  
[w]hile advocates for lesbian and gay parents once saw 
themselves as part of a larger movement to promote respect, 
nondiscrimination, and recognition of diverse family forms, some 
now appear to embrace a privileged position for marriage. They 
thus abandon a longstanding commitment to defining and 
evaluating families based on function rather than form, distancing 
themselves from single-parent and divorced families, extended 
families, and other stigmatized childrearing units.15
The Moynihan-esque flavor of some of the arguments made by the 
proponents of same-sex marriage is troubling for additional reasons as well. 
While the zone of the non-married parent is portrayed as a site of pathology, 
stigma, and injury to children, marriage is figured as the ideal social 
formation in which responsible reproduction can and should take place—
unfortunately, in increasingly racialized terms. While “our” side is arguing 
                                                 
12 Brief for American Psychological Association and New Jersey Psychological 
Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 51-52, Lewis v. Harris, 
875 A.2d 259 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2005) (No. A-2244-03T5), available at 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/binarydata/LAMBDA_PDF/pdf/320.pdf. William Eskridge 
made a similar argument in The Relational Case for Same-Sex Marriage, in JUST MARRIAGE 
60 (Mary Lyndon Shanley ed., 2004) (“To put the matter more positively, by denying gay 
men and lesbians the right to marry, the state is foregoing an opportunity to reinforce the 
stability of the two-parent household for the children of those relationships.”). 
13 See, e.g., Nancy Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay 
and Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every 
Marriage,” 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993); Nancy D. Polikoff, Ending Marriage as We Know 
It, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 201 (2003); Nancy D. Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less: The 
ALI Domestic Partner Principles Are One Step In The Right Direction, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 353 (2004). 
14 Nancy D. Polikoff, For the Sake of All Children: Opponents and Supporters of 
Same-Sex Marriage Both Miss the Mark, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 901, 901 (forthcoming 2006).  
15 Id. at 918. 
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how harmful it is to children of lesbigay parents that their parents cannot 
marry, “their” side claims, quite often successfully, that the structure, 
responsibilities, and boundaries of marriage render it the proper, if not 
divine, site for the bearing and rearing of children. A recent New York 
intermediate appellate court so held in Hernandez v. Robles:16 
The legislative policy rationale is that society and government 
have a strong interest in fostering heterosexual marriage as the 
social institution that best forges a linkage between sex, 
procreation and child rearing. It systematically regulates 
heterosexual behavior, brings order to the resulting procreation 
and ensures a stable family structure for the rearing, education 
and socialization of children (Goodridge, 440 Mass. at 381, 798 
N.E.2d at 995 [Cordy, J., dissenting]). Marriage promotes sharing 
of resources between men, women and the children that they 
procreate; provides a basis for the legal and factual assumption 
that a man is the father of his wife’s child via the legal 
presumption of paternity plus the marital expectations of 
monogamy and fidelity; and creates and develops a relationship 
between parents and child based on real, everyday ties. It is based 
on the presumption that the optimal situation for child rearing is 
having both biological parents present in a committed, socially 
esteemed relationship . . . . It sets up heterosexual marriage as the 
cultural, social and legal ideal in an effort to discourage 
unmarried childbearing and to encourage sufficient marital 
childbearing to sustain the population and society; the entire 
society, even those who do not marry, depend on a healthy 
marriage culture for this latter, critical, but presently undervalued, 
benefit.17
An Arizona appeals court made similar findings in Standhardt v. 
Superior Court,18 as did an Indiana appeals court in Morrison v. Sadler, 
which found that the State 
could legitimately create the institution of opposite-sex marriage, 
and all the benefits accruing to it, in order to encourage male-
female couples to procreate within the legitimacy and stability of 
a state-sponsored relationship and to discourage unplanned, out-
of-wedlock births resulting from “casual” intercourse. . . . [E]ven 
where an opposite-sex couple enters into a marriage with no 
intention of having children, “accidents” do happen, or persons 
often change their minds about wanting to have children. The 
                                                 
16 Hernandez v. Robles, 2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 09436 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t Dec. 
8, 2005) (No. 103434/04). 
17 Id. (second citation omitted). 
18 77 P.3d 451, 463-64 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). 
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institution of marriage not only encourages opposite-sex couples 
to form a relatively stable environment for the ‘natural’ 
procreation of children in the first place, but it also encourages 
them to stay together and raise a child or children together if 
there is a “change in plans.”19
This is what the Indiana court termed “responsible procreation.” 
Same-sex couples, on the other hand, do have children, but never by 
mistake. The effort and planning that goes into conception or adoption for 
gay couples assures that they are being responsible when they decide to 
parent. So, gay couples do not need the governance structure of marriage in 
order to exercise “responsible procreation” because they cannot procreate 
by accident—nature and the planning it requires renders them more 
responsible.  
Not far behind the natalism adopted by these courts is a racist 
ideology unashamedly articulated by Maggie Gallagher in papers she has 
submitted in the same-sex marriage cases.20 Her argument runs like this: 
low fertility rates among Europeans and people of European descent 
threaten the continued viability of these cultures. Society needs an 
institution that will encourage white people to have children. Marriage is 
that institution. Low fertility rates are linked to the movement away from 
marriage. Thus, if white people in developed countries are not to become 
extinct, they must marry and have children.21  
Surely the Lawrence decision need not have inaugurated a politics 
of, or desire for, recognition in the gay community—but curiously it has, 
and it did so immediately. What I lament is a failure of the movement’s 
leaders to appreciate the creative political possibilities that the middle 
ground between criminalization and assimilation might have offered up. 
Leo Bersani has expressed sadness at the thought that homosexuals would 
quickly and easily settle for an intersubjectivity cleansed of all fantasmatic 
curiosity.22 We have, for now, though I hope not permanently, lost the 
opportunity to explore the possibilities of a “lawless homosexuality.” What 
would that be? How would it know itself? How would we know ourselves? 
What have been the costs of refusing the political and psychic uncertainty 
                                                 
19 821 N.E.2d 15, 24-25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 
20 Maggie Gallagher is the President of the Institute for Marriage and Public Policy 
whose motto is “strengthening marriage for a new generation.” 
21 See e.g., Declaration of Maggie Gallagher in Support of CCF’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Thomasson v. Newsom, No. 04-428794 (Super. Ct. San Francisco Mar. 
11, 2004). 
22 See LEO BERSANI, HOMOS (1995).  
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of refusing to immediately articulate and legally nail down what it means to 
be gay? What will happen to homo desire and homo sex when they run 
through the particular circuitry of fantasy sutured to marriage? What kinds 
of fantasmatic curiosities will become foreclosed or will wither—
particularly as our curiosity get channeled, indeed, tamed, in the direction of 
the familiar, the safe, and the respectable—the nuclear family. Let me be 
clear; I am not saying that the nuclear family is, as a matter of fact, always 
familiar, safe, and comfortable, although it certainly is respectable; but, it is 
all these things on a fantasmatic level. Finally, what kind of sexual publics 
and what forms of sociability might be made possible by a homosexuality 
that strategically sidesteps robust legal recognition and regulation?  
What renders the problem of non-recognition a kind of harm rather 
than an interesting opportunity is a particular combination of identity and 
desire—an identification with a form of normative kinship and more 
importantly an identification with the state. I find it rather astonishing that 
the core value of gay and lesbian politics would transform so quickly into a 
powerful desire for recognition by and identification with the state. That 
this transformation would be accomplished in such short order after our 
relationship to the state was one of mutual contempt, distrust, and fear 
renders it all the more hard to metabolize. I have watched with both awe 
and fear how in a few years the lesbian subject has transformed from being 
constituted by an antagonistic relationship to law to a desperate plea for 
law’s embrace. This transformation has manifest itself in a strategic, if not 
ideological, exchange of civil rights arguments based in privacy for those 
who assert a right to public recognition, legibility, and presence. Making 
reference to one of the most common formulations of the privacy principle 
in United States constitutional jurisprudence,23 Justice Sachs wrote in the 
Fourie judgment that “what the applicants in this matter seek is not the right 
to be left alone, but the right to be acknowledged as equals and to be 
embraced with dignity by the law.”24 Are private or public identities the 
only moves left to us? While I must confess no small measure of nostalgia 
for the fantasmatic possibilities that were enabled by being an outlaw in the 
1970s and 1980s—something my current queer students cannot and do not 
                                                 
23  In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928), Justice Brandeis 
famously identified a privacy principle in the constitution: 
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of 
happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of 
his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to 
be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, 
their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to 
be let alone -- the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.  
Id. 
24 Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, CCT 60/04 ¶ 77 (Dec. 1, 2005). 
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know—my sense of alienation from the contemporary infatuation with the 
state cannot be explained only by reference to that nostalgia.   
I think it is also important to consider how the shift from tolerance 
to recognition is, in fundamental ways, a governance project—governance 
in the sense that we seek to be included within a community of the 
governed on terms equal to others in that political community, but 
governance in another sense—a kind of governance of the self that is 
entailed in being subject to law. When we petition the state to recognize us, 
that recognition demands a form of address—in this case that form is one of 
kinship. The way the project has been set up, to be governed by the state not 
as abject criminals, but as citizen-subjects, presupposes the internalization 
of a set of norms of self-governance—self-governance within the couple 
and governance of the couple by the state. This is how the subject of gay 
rights political discourse has emerged as a couple. Hand in hand we 
approach the state arguing for inclusion in “We the People.” You see this in 
the legal papers filed in the marriage cases: they make a demand to be 
governed by the rights and responsibilities of marriage laws—duties of 
support, monogamy, fidelity, longevity—‘til death do us part. These cases 
articulate a yearning to be governed by and within the surveillance of the 
state. Yet the facts of the cases make clear that these parties have 
undertaken a form of extra-legal governance for some time. They have been 
together for five, ten, twenty years, have supported each other through 
sickness and health, good times and bad, have assumed joint responsibility 
for the rearing of children—all in the shadow of law. Indeed, the legal 
papers in the cases narrate and attest to the degree to which these are 
couples who have performed an idealized form of self-governance extra-
legally that, so the claim goes, entitles them to the rights of respect and 
recognition that legal marriage confers. For the plaintiffs in these cases, 
there is an added value to governance within marriage that the same form of 
governance in law’s shadow somehow lacks.  
This form of recognition the community now craves exacts a dear 
price. As lesbigay people are herded into a particular form of sociability—a 
narrow conception of family—we have lost an interest in, if not now 
disavow, other forms of sociality that a generation ago we celebrated. The 
queer critique of the liberal individual sought to explore new modes of 
affect and sociality. We had a thick account of stranger sociability, of 
intimacy, of desire, and of ways in which the political “I” would not 
presuppose a domestic and domesticated affiliation with a “You,” thereby 
collapsing into a “We.” To my ear, the loss of the concept of “me” into a 
conjugal, domesticated “we” at times echoes a longing for a kind of 
contemporary coverture, whereby one or both previously individuated 
subjects are dissolved into a joint legal and economic unit by and through 
the institution of marriage. In a sense, it is the state’s refusal to extend the 
privilege of legal merger to same-sex couples, and the insistence that we 
remain separate and individuated individuals, that gets figured as the injury 
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of the denial of same-sex marriage. Not every advocate of same-sex 
marriage insists on this kind of coverture qua civil right, but enough of the 
arguments in this domain emit such an odor that it gives me great pause.25
The cost of substituting a desire for governance by the state for 
other forms of desire is evident in many sectors of the lesbigay community 
and is not merely an academic concern, but rather one of life and death. I 
live in New York City, where the discovery of a single case of virulent new 
HIV was announced by the City’s Health Department in the last year. Both 
the virus and those who carry it are portrayed as resistant to treatment. The 
story we are told is that the gay man who carried this virus used crystal 
meth and then had indiscriminate unsafe sex. This man was putting the 
whole community at risk by his irresponsibility. The executive director of 
Gay Men’s Health Crisis, the largest and oldest HIV treatment and 
advocacy organization in the country, joined the outcry endorsing 
aggressive forms of public health interventions that only a few years ago 
were politically unthinkable and implausible. She argued that we are 
beyond the first days of the AIDS epidemic. We now know that we are part 
of a community that must take care of one another, and that we owe one 
another a duty of care not to misbehave. In essence, the argument reduces to: 
these are bad gays, and their bad behavior has caused a dangerous mutation 
of the virus, and their bad behavior violates a community norm.  
What she is arguing is that our community has evolved along with 
the HIV virus. We are now interconnected to one another in a kinship 
grid—and that grid imposes reciprocal responsibilities on us all. But of 
course this problem is much more complicated. As I listen to how this new 
crisis has unfolded in New York, I get the sense that the community no 
longer has a vocabulary that can address a public health problem as 
something other than a problem of kinship. We have no ready analysis that 
takes as one of its premises the value and meaning of stranger sociability, of 
sex outside of kinship, or of promiscuity. There is no evidence offered that 
crystal meth or promiscuous sex have caused the mutation of the virus. We 
have a single case of a single man who liked sex and liked lots of it. Yet 
kinship is not a rich enough political value or reliable enough public health 
variable to adequately address the failure to engage in protected sex. 
But this is where we are politically. Make no mistake, this problem 
at this moment is a political, not a legal problem. Our overwhelming 
investment in the politics of kinship has resulted in the atrophying of an 
ability to critically and creatively think sexuality outside the domestic 
couple. We have lost that vocabulary, and as a result all we have to fall 
back on is the vilification of our new Patient Zero for his violation of the 
norms of today’s gay community—characterized by reciprocal duties and 
self-governance. 
                                                 
25 I must thank Jeannine DeLombard for suggesting the analogy to coverture. 
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The final concern that I want to highlight in this Essay relates to the 
manner in which the politics of same-sex marriage figures in larger national 
and international politics. I actually do not think that gay marriage won the 
election for George Bush, but what it did do was distract our attention away 
from other issues of much greater concern—Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, and 
the war in Iraq, to name only a few. The “national debate” about morals cut 
off national discussion about increasing the security state, sexuality as 
weapons of war, and the militarization of foreign policy. In similar fashion, 
Terry Schaivo was used to articulate a “culture of life” in the face of a kind 
of necropolitics and the implementation of a radical—if not permanent—
state of exception in the Schmittian sense. 
I lament how the gay and lesbian community fails to link up to 
these larger political issues and rather passively allows the same-sex 
marriage debate to be used as a distraction. All the while installing a new 
form of homo desire—a desire for a relationship to the nation, for 
recognition by the nation. Not only has the gay community acquired a 
desire for the state, but, as Judith Butler puts it, the push for marriage 
articulates a desire for the state’s desire in the form of state-sanctioned 
desire. In a period of rising United States nationalism and its more even evil 
twin imperialism, I find it quite troubling that a formally radical movement 
of outlaws and outsiders would succumb so quickly and entirely to 
becoming what the former New Jersey Governor Jim McGreevey called 
himself: “Gay Americans.”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
